Abstract
Introduction
(Müllerian) mimicry ring, where three or more unpalatable species show the similar appearances to avoid 50 predation (Sherratt, 2008) . Examples of Müllerian mimicry rings include Appalachian millipedes (Marek 51 & Bond, 2009) , bumble bees (Plowright & Owen, 1980) , cotton-stainer bugs (Zrzavý & Nedvěd, 1999) , 52 and Heliconius butterflies (Mallet & Gilbert, 1995) . In the context of division of labor, as well, mutualistic 53 symbioses are not limited to one-to-one relationships. For example, green algae can display mutualism 54 with with several phylogenetically broad fungal species (Hom & Murray, 2014) .
55
Inspired by these biological examples, I investigated whether faster evolution or slower evolution is 56 favored in communities that include more than two species. First, I built the model where M species 57 coexist and the population size of each species is infinitely large. This model is an extended version of 58 Bergstrom & Lachmann (2003) with respect to the number of species in the communities. I shall show 59 the conditions for a linear stable equilibrium of an arbitrary number of species in the communities, and 60 a mixture of the RK and the RQ effects. Interestingly, in this model, all stable equilibria have the same 61 number of generous species, wherein all individuals play the generous strategy and pay a larger cost.
62
Then, the assumption of the infinite population size was relaxed, and I analyzed the communities where 63 each species has a different population size. In this case, each stable equilibrium has various numbers of 64 generous species, which never occurs if the population size of each species is infinitely large.
65

Models
66
In this paper, I first extend the original model of the Red King effect (Bergstrom & Lachmann, 2003) by 67 generalizing the number of species in a community. Mutualistic symbioses with a degree of conflict are 
where 0 ≤ k ≤ 2. As shown in equation (1), each species performs either a generous strategy or a selfish 70 strategy, and the left payoff in each cell is for species i and the right payoff is for species j. It is assumed 71 that each individual performs the same strategy regardless of the partner species and that all species play 72 the same game defined by equation (1).
73
In this model, the fitness of each species is determined only by the interspecific interactions (i.e.,
74
intraspecific interactions are ignored). Given the number of species in the community M , the evolutionary 75 > 0 Relative population size of species i M ≥ 2 (integer) Number of species in the community dynamics of the fraction of generous individuals in species i is given by the replicator dynamics as below:
where r i is the evolutionary rate of species i, f g i is the mean fitness of the generous individuals in species 77 i,f i is the mean fitness of species i, and N i is the relative population size of species i. 
wherex j =i is the average fraction of generous individuals except for species i:
Notice that equation (4) number of generous species m should satisfy the inequality below:
The derivation is shown in Appendix A. It should be noted that there exists at most one integer m that 115 satisfies inequality (6) given the values of k and M . In a community with three species (M = 3), for 116 example, one species is generous (m = 1) and two species are selfish at a stable equilibrium if k is small 117 (0 ≤ k < 1); on the other hand, there exist two generous species (m = 2) and one selfish species at a 118 stable equilibrium if k is large (1 < k ≤ 2).
119
Although inequality (6) shown in Fig. 1 and the relationship between the initial conditions and the stable equilibrium where the 127 dynamics converge in the three species model is shown in Fig. 2 . The relationship between the order of the evolutionary rates and the probability that each species becomes selfish at stable equilibria (i.e., favorability) are shown. Top: the hypothetical results if RK effect or RQ effect operates; there should be a negative (positive) relationships between the order of evolutionary rates and the favorability. However, the results of computer simulations (Middle: three species, and Bottom: four species) do not show such relationships except for the case of small k in the four species community. The parameters are: r = (1/8, 1, 8), and k = 0.5 (small) or k = 1.5 (large) in the three species model, and r = (1/8, 1/2, 2, 8) and k = 0.5 (small) or k = 1.6 (large) in the four species model.
Except for the case of the four species model with small k, there is no clear RQ effect nor RK effect 129 in Fig. 1 ; there exists no linear relationship between the evolutionary rates and probabilities that each 130 species becomes selfish (favorability). Rather, in the three species community, the slowly evolving species communities.
138
To understand these results in detail, I investigated which species is the most liley to fix it's strategy 139 first and whether this first fixed species is morel ikely to become generous or selfish in the three species
140
and four species models, respectively. Tables 2 and 3 show that as evolutionary rate increases, the more 141 the species is likely to be the first fixed species, regardless of the value of k. The direction of evolution 142 of the first fixed species is, however, different according to the value of k. When k is small, the first 143 fixed species is more likely to evolve toward selfishness than generosity, indicating that faster evolution 144 is favored in both three and four species models. On the other hand, slower evolution is favored when k 145 is large as the first fixed species is more likely to evolve toward generous species than selfish one. Equation (4) helps the understanding of the effect of k on the direction of evolution. As r i > 0 and 147 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, the sign of 1 + (k − 3)x j =i (t) determines the evolutionary direction of species i (positive:
146
148 generous, and negative: selfish) at given time t. As the initial fractions of generous individuals in each 149 (0) is
Due to the assumption of the uniform distribution of x i (0), the distribution ofx j =i (0) is symmetric.
151
Species i is, therefore, more likely to initially evolve toward being generous (or being selfish) if and only
The upper (lower) sign of inequality (8) is the condition where species i is more likely to initially evolve . If the initial condition of the two species is uniformly i.i.d., the area under each line is where the third species initially evolves toward the generous species, while the area above the line is where the third species initially evolves toward being selfish. If k = 0.5 (or k = 1.5), the third species is more likely to initially evolve toward being selfish (generous) than being generous (selfish).
It should be noted that inequality (8) suggests the only initial evolutionary direction of each species;
158 the evolutionary direction can change over time as the fraction of generous individuals in each species changes. To obtain the evolutionary direction of species i at arbitrary time t, it is necessary to find the is more likely to be a generous (selfish) species if k > 1 (k < 1), as shown in inequality (8). After the 167 fastest species fixes it strategy, the other species fix their strategies in order of the evolutionary rates 168 in this idealized situation. The probability that each species becomes selfish, however, depends on the 169 number of species that have already fixed their strategies as generous species (i.e., the evolutionary fates 170 of the faster species than focal one). Given that f 0 is the number of species which are fixed as selfish 171 species and f 1 is the number of species which are fixed as generous species in M species community, let 172 us consider the evolutionary fate of the focal species species f , which is the f 0 + f 1 + 1 -th fastest species 
where the upper (lower) sign is the case when species f is more likely to be generous (selfish). Notice that 177 the mean of the left hand side of inequality (9) Therefore, the right hand side of inequality (9) is regarded as the threshold of the evolutionary direction 181 of species f :
If T f is larger (smaller) than 0.5, species f is more likely to be generous (selfish), meaning that the fastest 2nd fastest Figure 4 : The schematic illustration of the shift of evolutionary direction over time
The threshold of the evolutionary direction can change as one one species fixes the strategy. Under the ideal conditions, the evolutionary fate of the fastest species (i = 1) is determined only by the value of k. The threshold for the second fastest species (i = 2) is determined not only by k but also the strategy of the fastest species. Notice that the threshold for the second fastest species T2 is different from that of the fastest species T1 regardless of the evolutionary fate of the fastest species (generous: red and, selfish: blue, in top column).
favored over time (Fig 4) .
186
In addition, it is possible to compute whether focal species f is more likely to become generous 187 or selfish under the ideal conditions. As it is mentioned above, the left hand side of Inequality (9) 188 approximately follows the normal distribution where the mean is 0.5 and the inverse of the variance is 189 12(R − 1). Given that the combination of (f 0 , f 1 ), the probability that focal species become generous or 190 selfish is computable using the cumulative probability distribution of the normal distribution mentioned 191 above. The probability of the combinations of (f 0 , f 1 ) can be sequentially obtained according to the 192 evolutionary rates (Fig. 4) . Therefore, one can compute the favorability of the focal species in the in Fig. 1 ; there exists the nonlinear relationship between the evolutionary rates and the favorabilities. The favorabilities of each species in the three species communities (M = 3) and the four species communities (M = 4) are computed under the ideal conditions. using different value of k (in the three species communities, k = 0.5 for small k and k = 1.5 for large k whereas k = 0.5 for small k and k = 1.6 for large k in the four species community). It is assumed that the left hand side of Inequality (9) is distributed according to the normal distribution if R > 2; otherwise the uniform distribution is used for the distribution of the left hand side in inequality (9).
The detail is explained in Appendix C.
197
The shift of the conditions whether the faster evolution or the slower evolution is favored under this the species that remain unfixed is obtained, it is possible to predict whether each species i is more likely 204 to evolve toward being selfish or generous at arbitrary time t. In this case, however, it is insufficient to 205 calculate the mean of j =i,remaining x j (t) a in the right hand side of Inequality (9); it is necessary to 206 calculate the probability density distribution of j =i,remaining x j (t) and comparing with T i . 
Various population sizes 208
Next, I relaxed the assumption that the population size of each species is infinitely large. Here, I assume 209 that the population sizes are large enough that ordinary differential equations can be used, but each 210 species has an arbitrary population size. Although Veller et al. (2017) show that population size has an 211 effect on the evolutionary rates, it is assumed here that other factors such as the mutation rate or the 212 generation time determine the evolutionary rates of each species.
213
In the case of the various population size model, the evolutionary dynamics defined in equation (3) 214 are written as
where 
219
The stable exterior equilibrium (x * i ∈ {0, 1} ∀i) should satisfy the conditions below:
The derivation is shown in Appendix B. It should be noted that the population sizes do not affect the 221 stability of each equilibrium in the case of M = 2. Inequalities (12) suggest that we need to evaluate 222 matrix W = {w ij } and the value of k for all possible 2 M combinations of the evolutionary fate of the 223 species in the community (Fig. 6) . Although the evolutionary rates its self do not change the stability 224 of each equilibrium, they affect the size of the basin of attraction (Fig. 6b ). On the other had, the 225 value of k and matrix W (or the relative population size vector N ) change the stability of the interior 226 equilibria (Fig. 6c) . Interestingly, each stable equilibrium does not always hold the same number of 227 generous (and of course, selfish) species given the values of k and N (Fig. 6d) , which never occurs in with generous individuals, which leads the evolution toward selfish species, and vice versa.
233
In the model with various population sizes, the evolutionary direction of each species is determined by 1+(k −3) j =i w ij x j (t) at arbitrary time t, which is difficult to analytically solve. However, it is possible 235 to find the shift of the condition where faster or slower evolution is favored by rewriting inequality (12)
236
as below:
The left hand side of inequality (13) proposed by (Bergstrom & Lachmann, 2003 RQ effect do not always operate; rather, they can be mixed and the relationship between the order of 257 evolutionary rates and the probability that each species becomes selfish can be complex. This is because and the inverse of the variance is 12(R − 1). As one species fixes it strategy, however, the right hand side 264 of inequality (9) or T f changes. Intuitively, this is because the fixed species continues having an effect on 265 the evolution of remaining species. Although it is difficult to obtain the probability density distribution 266 of the left hand side of inequality (9) without the assumption of the ideal situation, the change of T f 267 still occurs, and this is the reason why Fig. 1 can show the nonlinear relationships between the order of 268 evolutionary rates and the favorability.
269
While (Veller et al., 2017) previously showed the shift between RK effect and RQ effect on short time 270 scales and the long time scales, the models in this paper show the shift of the conditions where faster 271 evolution or slower evolution is favored as one species fixes its strategy. This result predicts difficulty in 272 comparing experimental results with the hypothesis of RK effect. In recent years, it has become possible 273 to estimate the evolutionary rates of some species (for example, Rubin & Moreau (2016) ). Even when 274 the evolutionary rates of the two mutualistic species are estimated, however, it would be difficult to test 275 the prediction from the theories whether the faster evolution or the slower evolution is favorable, because 276 this study shows that if another species mutually interacts with the two species, this third species has an 277 effect of the favorability of the evolutionary rates of the two species. In other words, it is necessary to 278 consider the all mutualistic interactions the focal species have for the comparison with theoretical studies.
279
Of course, this research has some limitations. First, it would be unnatural that all species play the show the maintenance of cooperation (Hauert et al., 2006) and complex dynamics (Gokhale & Hauert, 290 2016). Such eco-evolutionary dynamics can also be analyzed in the mutualism with a degree of conflict.
291
In summary, this study analyzed the evolution of mutualism in the multi-species communities by 292 generalizing the model proposed by Bergstrom & Lachmann (2003) . Whether each species has the same 293 population size or not, the conditions for the stable equilibria can be derived. In addition, the models in 294 this paper suggest that RK or RQ effect do not always operate in the communities with more than two 295 species. This is because the conditions whether the faster evolution or the slower evolution is favored can 296 change as one species fixes it strategy.
297
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Appendix A Stability analysis of infinite population sizes
303
Here, the linear stability of the equilibria in the model with infinite population sizes given by equation (4) 304 is performed and I prove that stable equilibria are only those which has m generous species and M − m 305 selfish species, where integer m satisfies inequality (6).
306
The element of the Jacobian matrix of equation (4) at the equilibrium x * is represented by
To analyze the stability of each equilibrium, I classified the equilibria into the two class: (i) an exterior 308 equilibrium where all elements are either 0 or 1 (∀i, x * i ∈ {0, 1}), and (ii) an interior equilibrium which 309 holds at least one element between 0 and 1 (∃i, 0 < x * i < 1).
310
Appendix A.1 Stability of exterior equilibria
311
In the case of an exterior equilibrium, the Jacobian matrix J of such equilibrium is given by
where m is the number of generous species at this equilibrium. As this Jacobian matrix is a diagonal 313 matrix with am exterior equilibrium, the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are the same as the diagonal 314 elements of the Jacobian matrix. The exterior equilibrium is, therefore, linearly stable if and only if
Here, inequalities (6) are obtained. section, the full interior equilibrium is first analyzed because the stability analysis for the full interior 321 equilibrium is simple. Then, the analysis for the partially interior equilibrium is shown.
322
There exist a unique full interior equilibrium in the evolutionary dynamics given by equation (4):
The Jacobian matrix at this equilibrium is written as
where that Routh-Hurwitz criteria do not hold (Murray, 2002 , Appendix B.1).
330
Proof. First, let consider the case when M = 2. Then, the characteristic equation is written as
where λ is the eigenvalue of the Jacobian matrix given by equation (17), I is the identity matrix, and 332 |λI − J| is the determinant of matrix λI − J. Obviously, the coefficient of λ is zero.
333
Next, let assume that the coefficient of M − 1th order in the characteristic equation is zero when 334 M = 2, 3, . . . , n. If M = n + 1, the characteristic equation is
The first term in equation (19) is
where J n×n is n × n matrix while J in equation (19) is (n + 1) × (n + 1) matrix. The second term in 337 equation (19) is, on the other hand, the n − 1th degree equation of λ. The coefficient of nth order in 338 equation (19) is, therefor, zero. Routh-Hurwitz criteria hold, the full interior equilibrium is not stable.
342
Next, let consider the stability of the partially interior equilibria. At a partially interior equilibrium,
343
I denoted the number of selfish and generous species as f 0 and f 1 , respectively. The number of remaining 344 species is R = M − (f 0 + f 1 ) and both generous individuals and selfish ones coexist within each species.
The elements of partially interior equilibrium is represented as below:
The Jacobian matrix of such equilibrium is written as equation (17) 
In the case of the exterior equilibria, Jacobian matrix is a diagonal matrix. An exterior equilibrium is the values of f 0 and f 1 are given, on the other hand, we can calculate T f and the conditional probability 365 that focal species f become generous (and selfish) by using the cumulative probability distribution of the 366 left hand side in inequality (9).
367
The probabilities of the combinations of (f 0 , f 1 ) for species f are sequentially computable according 368 to the order of the evolutionary rates as follows. For the fastest species, one can obtain the proba-369 bility that the fastest species becomes generous and selfish, respectively. Notice that the probabilities ity that the fastest species becomes generous or selfish, respectively. As one can obtain the conditional 372 probability that the second fastest species become generous given the combinations of (f 0 , f 1 ) using the 373 same method which is used for calculating the probability that the fastest species become generous or 374 selfish, it is possible to compute the probability that the second species becomes generous or selfish,
375
respectively.
376
Using Prob (f 0 , f 1 ) for the second fastest species and the conditional probabilities that the second 377 fastest species become generous or selfish, Prob (f 0 , f 1 ) for the third fastest species is computable, meaning 378 that the probabilities that the third fastest species become generous or selfish are also computable.
379
Repeating this calculation, the favorability of the focal species is computable in the arbitrary number 
